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Abstract. Personalised pricing uses (big) data and artificial intelligence to allow suppliers to sell 
goods and services to each consumer at the maximum price that each individual consumer is 
prepared to pay for such good or service. Quite a lot of research focuses on whether suppliers 
using personalised pricing infringe upon EU laws and if so, what measures can be taken to act 
against such infringement. In general, EU consumer laws seem to allow for personalised pricing 
as long as the consumer has been duly informed thereof. However, if a consumer has not been 
so informed and national law allows for nullification of an agreement concluded under the 
influence thereof, the question arises what the civil law consequences of such nullification are. 
On this area of law, surprisingly little research has been conducted. It is this void I attempt to fill, 
in particular in relation to (national law implementing) the EU Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive 2005/29. This is important because the EU has left it up to individual EU Member 
States to provide “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions against infringements of that 
directive. If research shows that the consequences of nullification do not meet that test and are 
perhaps even dead letters, other measures must be considered. Using Dutch and Belgian law as 
an example, three possible consequences of nullification will be analysed against the backdrop 
of this test: (1) let the consumer keep the good delivered or service provided free of charge, (2) 
let the consumer return the good or service delivered in exchange for the price paid minus a 
compensation for the use he/she has made of such product or service or (3) achieve a price 
reduction by means of partial nullification or full nullification with conversion. In this article, it will 
be shown that what makes this research challenging, especially in relation to the second option, 
is that existing laws with respect to the consequences of nullification are ill-equipped to deal with 
situations where the good or service acquired is perfectly fine, as is the case in case of 
personalised pricing. In this article, it will also be demonstrated that additional difficulties are 
encountered when focusing instead on the pricing side of the equation, as the third option does, 
because judges would effectively reduce a sanction and that is contrary to case law of the 
European Court of Justice. The compensatory nature of a personalised pricing system - a loss 
on one transaction is compensated by a profit on another transaction - makes it even more 
difficult for a judge to intervene in individual cases. The conclusion reached is that, in light of 
these and other difficulties, measures other than the exercise of individual nullification rights 
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According to the OECD Secretariat’s background note titled ‘Personalised Pricing in the Digital 
Era’, personalised pricing can be defined as “any practice of price discriminating final consumers 
based on their personal characteristics and conduct, resulting in prices being set as an 
increasing function of consumers’ willingness to pay…”.1 Using personalised pricing, suppliers 
seek to sell goods and services to each individual consumer at the maximum price they are 
prepared to pay for such good or service. Personalised pricing is becoming easier day by day 
because of developments in big data, bandwidth, storage, artificial intelligence and computing 
power. By using tracking and other cookies, for example, the consumer’s surfing behaviour can 
be monitored and, combined with more data, used to determine the maximum price a consumer 
is prepared to pay for the good or service to be offered. In light of these technological 
developments, the question whether personalised pricing is desirable and permissible is 
becoming more and more topical, as is the question what measures can be taken in the event it 
is deemed non-permissible, e.g. because it is considered to be an infringement of EU consumer 
or privacy laws. Although quite a lot of research has been done to answer these questions, there 
are not yet clear-cut answers.2 In spite of this, I will not try to answer these questions in this 
article, save to say (and explain in more detail below) that in general, EU consumer laws seem to 
allow for personalised pricing as long as the consumer has been duly informed thereof. 
Instead, I will focus on one specific question on which far less research has been 
conducted: assuming that personalised pricing amounts to an infringement of (national law 
implementing) the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29 (UCPD) due to lack of 
information on personalised pricing,3 what are the consequences of individual consumers4 
                                                   
1 OECD, ‘Background Note by the Secretariat, Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era’ DAF/COMP 
(2018) 13, <oecd.org/daf/competition/personalised-pricing-in-the-digital-era.htm>, accessed 15 
September 2019, section 17-19, which also distinguishes personalised pricing from dynamic pricing 
which “involves adjusting prices to changes in demand and supply, often real time, not implying any 
kind of discrimination between consumers.” and other forms of online personalisation, such as A/B 
testing, targeted advertising and price steering (explained in section 19). 
2 See OECD (n 1) for an economic analysis (section 3), a competition policy analysis (section 4), 
consumer protection analysis (section 5) and privacy and data protection analysis (section 6), as well 
as the literature mentioned therein; Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document Guidance on 
the Implementation/Application Of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices’ COM (2016) 
320 final, paragraph 5.2.13 and the UK Office of Fair Trading (now the Competition and Markets 
Authority — CMA) ‘Personalised Pricing, Increasing Transparency to Improve Trust, OFT 1489’ 
(2013) 
<https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402165101/http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/markets-
work/personalised-pricing/oft1489.pdf>, accessed 15 September 2019. See also Willem H van Boom, 
‘Price Intransparency, Consumer Decision Making and European Consumer Law’ (2011) 34 J 
Consum Policy 359. For a privacy law analysis see Richard Steppe, ‘Prijsdiscriminatie in het digitale 
tijdperk. Beschouwingen over de nieuwe Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming’ in Matthias 
E Storme and Frederic Helsen (eds.), Innovatie en disruptie in het economisch recht (Intersentia 
2017) 105-149, Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius and Joost Poort, ‘Online price discrimination and EU 
data privacy law’ (2017) 40 J Consum Policy 347, for an empirical study Joost Poort and Frederik J 
Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Does everyone have a price? Understanding people’s attitude towards online 
and offline price discrimination’ (2019) 8 Internet Policy Review 1 DOI: 10.14763/2019.1.1383 and 
Joost Poort and Frederik J Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Prijsdiscriminatie, privacy, en publieke opinie’ 
(2019) July/August Ars Aequi 580. For an economic point of view, see Rosa-Branca Esteves & Sofia 
Cerqueira, ‘Behavior-based pricing under imperfectly informed consumers’ (2017) 40 Information 
Economics and Policy 60 and the sources referred to therein. 
3 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council 
Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[2005] OJ L149/22. 
4 I recognise that lodging individual claims may not be practical in those cases where the 
disadvantage/damage suffered is low, yet an analysis of individual claims makes sense because it is 
often a precondition or precursor of collective action. See for a discussion of collective enforcement 
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successfully nullifying an agreement on account of such infringement?5 This is important 
because the EU has left it up to individual EU Member States to provide “effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive” sanctions against such infringements, see art. 13 UCPD. If research shows that 
the consequences of nullification do not meet that test and are perhaps even dead letters, other 
measures must be considered. However, given the scope, focus and length of this article, I will 
only briefly touch upon the existence of such other measures and leave it up to others to conduct 
further research on the effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of such other 
measures. Such measures could be collective enforcement as well as enforcement by 
competitors and administrative authorities.6 And such measures may well lead to the conclusion 
that although certain individual sanctions do not pass the “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive” test, the entire arsenal of sanctions does. 
I will proceed to answer the foregoing question as follows. First, I will give a short 
overview of consumer law insofar relevant to personalised pricing and, in particular, the UCPD 
(in section 2). Subsequently, I will analyse possible consequences of nullification against the 
back-drop of this “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” test: (1) let the consumer keep the 
product (i.e. good delivered or service provided7) free of charge (in section 3, using Belgian law 
as an example), (2) let the consumer return the product in exchange for the price paid minus a 
compensation for the use he/she has made of such product (by means of full nullification and 
subsequently mitigating the consequences; in section 4, using Dutch law as an example) or (3) 
achieve a price reduction (by means of partial nullification or full nullification with conversion; in 
section 5, again using Dutch law as an example). When discussing each of these three possible 
scenarios, in each case a conscious choice has been made to use either Dutch or Belgian law by 
way of example and not in each case discuss both Dutch and Belgian law in depth. In the first 
scenario, this is because Dutch law does not contain a similar sanction. In the second and third 
scenario, I will do so because I prefer an in-depth analysis on the basis of a system of law I have 
been educated in and practiced for many years and because my analysis of Belgian law will 
presumably not be of the same quality. I will also do so because Dutch law is used merely as an 
example and I invite the reader to decide him-/herself, on the basis of the intricacies and 
nuances of the law which he/she is most familiar with, whether the same or similar reasoning as 
the reasoning provided for Dutch law is or needs be used for his/her own system of law. 
Nonetheless, I will briefly touch upon certain aspects of Belgian law in the second and third 
scenarios to provide to the reader a starting point for further research and analysis and will do so 
mostly in footnotes so as not to interrupt the flow of the arguments presented. 
 
2. EU consumer law and the UCPD 
 
Although this article assumes that personalised pricing is considered an unfair commercial 
practice and focuses on the consequences of nullification, it is insightful to briefly explain, by way 
of introduction, how personalised pricing could constitute an infringement of national law 
                                                   
and more generic actions resulting in nullification (based e.g. on error or fraud) Willem H van Boom, 
‘Inpassing en handhaving van de Wet oneerlijke handelspraktijken’ (2008) 1 Tijdschrift voor 
Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 4 and Willem H van Boom, ‘Oneerlijke handelspraktijk is 
onrechtmatige daad. Maar wat schieten we daar mee op?’ (2008) 3 NTBR 125. 
5 See also Carla H Sieburgh, Tertium Datur. De niet uitgesloten derde in het burgerlijk recht. 
Inaugural lecture Nijmegen (Kluwer 2004), who argues that in deciding whether an agreement is valid, 
both the invalidity as well as its consequences need to be considered.  
6 See for an overview with respect to Dutch law: DW Feer Verkade, Oneerlijke handelspraktijken 
jegens consumenten (Monografieën BW nr. B49a) (Wolters Kluwer 2016) nr. 75-80 (collective 
enforcement), nr. 74 (competitors) and nr. 81-87 (administrative enforcement by the Authority for 
Consumers & Markets and others). See for an overview with respect to Belgian law: Sofie De Pourcq, 
De bescherming van ondernemingen tegen oneerlijke handelspraktijken in de contractuele 
verhouding. Doctoral Thesis KU Leuven (Intersentia 2018) nr. 411 (collective enforcement), nr. 416 
(cessation order, monetary penalty and damages) and nr. 417 (competitors). 
7 Art. 2 paragraph (c) UCPD defines “product” as “any goods or service including immovable property, 
rights and obligations;”. 
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implementing EU consumer laws, in particular unfair commercial practices laws.8 As a starting 
point, the latest proposal for an EU directive on a better enforcement and modernisation of EU 
consumer protection rules9 seeks to make the following additions to the Consumer Rights 
Directive 2011/83 (“CRD”).10 According to that proposal, the new recital 45 of the CRD will read 
“Traders may personalise the price of their offers for specific consumers or specific categories of 
consumers based on automated decision making and profiling of consumer behaviour allowing 
traders to assess the consumer's purchasing power. Consumers should therefore be clearly 
informed when the price presented to them is personalised on the basis of an automated 
decision, so that they would take into account the potential risks in their decision-making. 
Consequently, a specific information requirement should be added to Directive 2011/83/EU to 
inform the consumer when the price is personalised based on automated decision-making. This 
information requirement should not apply to techniques such as 'dynamic' or 'real-time' pricing 
that involves changing the price in a highly flexible and quick manner in response to market 
demands when it does not involve personalisation based on automated decision making.” And, 
according to that proposal, the new article 6 paragraph 1 under (ea) of the CRD will read “Before 
the consumer is bound by a distance or off-premises contract, or any corresponding offer, the 
trader shall provide the consumer with the following information in a clear and comprehensible 
manner: (ea) where applicable, that the price was personalised on the basis of automated 
decision making;”. From these additions, it can be deduced that from an EU consumer law 
perspective, personalised pricing is permissible as long as the consumer is informed thereof. 
Otherwise, the legislative proposal would have sought to prohibit personalised pricing in whole or 
in part. 
Seeing, however, that this legislative proposal has not yet been adopted and, if adopted, 
gives Member States 24 months to transpose this legislation into national law, it is time to focus 
on existing EU consumer laws. Having said that, this is more difficult, because existing EU 
consumer laws do not contain specific rules about personalised pricing, but ‘only’ (1) general 
information requirements about the price charged or (2) general rules about unfair trade 
practices. There are two examples of general information requirements about the price charged 
which may perhaps be applied to personalised pricing. First of all, it has been argued that 
(national law implementing) art. 5 paragraph 2 of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/3111 requires 
that the service provider informs the consumer that personalised pricing is used, failing which the 
consumer is entitled to sue the service provider for damages on account of tort.12 Secondly, it 
has been argued that the trader is required to inform the consumer that personalised pricing is 
used on the basis of (national law implementing) the aforementioned article 6 paragraph 1, but in 
this case under (e) of the CRD. Failing to abide by this information requirement would allow the 
consumer to nullify the agreement on account of national law implementing this mandatory article 
6 (see article 25).13 
                                                   
8 See in general Vanessa Mak, ‘Gedachten bij een ‘gepersonaliseerd’ consumentenrecht’ (2018) 6 
Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 274. 
9 European Parliament, Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 17 April 2019 
with a view to the adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/… of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Directive 98/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 
2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards better enforcement and 
modernisation of EU consumer protection rules COD (2018) 0090. 
10 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on 
consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ L304/64. 
11 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on electronic commerce) [2000] OJ L178/1.  
12 Evert DC Neppelenbroek, ‘Wat de gek ervoor geeft. Big Data en de bescherming van de 
contractuele wederpartij bij prijsdiscriminatie’ (2017) 7110 WPNR 447-448 with respect to the Dutch 
law implementation art. 3:15d paragraph 2 Dutch Civil Code (DCC).  
13 Neppelenbroek (n 13) with respect to the Dutch law implementation art. 6:230m paragraph 1 under 
e, art. 6:230i paragraph 1 and art. 3:40 paragraph 2 DCC and see footnote 33 of Neppelenbroek’s 
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However, it has also been argued - and I tend to agree - that it is stretching it to deduce 
such information obligations about personalised pricing from general obligations requiring 
suppliers to inform consumers about the price of the product or service offered.14 Therefore, 
attention has tended to shift to the question whether a failure to inform the consumer about 
personalised pricing could or should be considered an infringement of the UCPD. Before 
answering this question, I make the following preliminary observations about the UCPD. The 
UCPD is a maximum harmonisation directive.15 This means that EU Member States must 
implement the directive into their national laws and in doing so, may not provide for more 
consumer protection, but also not less. The directive does not list personalised pricing as a 
commercial practice which is regarded as unfair in all circumstances (art. 5 paragraph 5 jo. 
Annex I). Also, it is unlikely that personalised pricing is considered to be aggressive (art. 8-9) or 
actively misleading (art. 6). 
If personalised pricing can be considered to be an infringement of the UCPD at all, it will 
most likely be on the basis of the supplier not informing the consumer that personalised pricing is 
used. Such omission could amount to an infringement of the UCPD either on account of it being 
an unfair commercial practice because it is a misleading omission within the meaning of art. 5 
paragraph 4 (a) jo. 7 or, more generally, an unfair commercial practice within the meaning of art. 
5 paragraph 2. In both cases, a causality requirement and materiality threshold need to be met. 
In the case of a misleading omission, “material information” needs to be omitted which “causes 
or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not 
have taken otherwise.” (art. 7 paragraph 1 and 2). In the case of the more general unfair 
commercial practice, the commercial practice is only considered unfair if “it materially distorts or 
is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour with regard to the product”, i.e. “appreciably 
impair[s] the consumer's ability to make an informed decision, thereby causing the consumer to 
take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise” (art. 5 paragraph 2 jo. 2 
paragraph e).16 Whether the average consumer would have procured the product had that 
consumer known that personalised pricing was used to set the price is quite a difficult question to 
answer. On the one hand, it can be argued that personalised pricing results in the average 
consumer paying the maximum price that he/she is prepared to pay and therefore he/she would 
likely have concluded the agreement and pay that price even if he/she had known personalised 
pricing was used. On the other hand, it can also be argued that had the average consumer 
known that personalised pricing was used, he/she would have searched elsewhere and procured 
the same or a similar product or service from another webshop at a lower price. In any case, 
merely proving that the average consumer would have bought the product from the webshop at a 
lower price had he/she been informed of personalised pricing would presumably be insufficient 
because the webshop, had it informed the consumer that personalised pricing was used, would 
not have provided the consumer with a possibility to procure the product at a lower price 
(because webshop offers are almost always take-it-or-leave-it and even if they are not, allowing 
                                                   
article for a discussion on whether or not causality between the conclusion of the agreement and the 
failure to provide the information should be proven and by whom. 
14 ME Bulten, ‘Online prijspersonalisatie in het Nederlandse consumentenrecht’ (2018) 4 Tijdschrift 
voor Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 186-187. 
15 See art. 4 UCPD: “Member States shall neither restrict the freedom to provide services nor restrict 
the free movement of products for reasons falling within the field approximated by this Directive.” and 
ECJ Cases C-261/07 and C-299/07 VTB v Total Belgium and Galatea v Sanoma [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:244 paragraph 51-52: “That having been determined, it must first be recalled that the 
Directive is intended to establish, in accordance with recitals 5 and 6 in the preamble thereto and 
Article 1 thereof, uniform rules on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in order to 
contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market and to achieve a high level of consumer 
protection. Thus, the Directive fully harmonises those rules at the Community level. Accordingly, as 
Article 4 thereof expressly provides …, Member States may not adopt stricter rules than those 
provided for in the Directive, even in order to achieve a higher level of consumer protection.” 
16 The UCPD provides more guidance on the applicability of the causality requirement in recital 6 in 
that it “does not affect accepted advertising and marketing practices, such as legitimate product 
placement, brand differentiation or the offering of incentives which may legitimately affect consumers' 
perceptions of products and influence their behaviour without impairing the consumer's ability to make 
an informed decision.” 
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for this possibility would defeat the purpose of his pricing mechanism). Answering this question in 
more detail is, however, out of scope for the purposes of this article. 
Moving on: the aforementioned definitions of what constitutes an unfair commercial 
practice are harmonised and should therefore be the same in each EU Member State. The 
sanctions for infringements of those provisions are, however, not harmonised. Each Member 
State may choose how to sanction those infringements, as long as those sanctions are, as the 
UCPD prescribes, “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (art. 13).17 As explained, I will now 
analyse the consequences of a number of possible consequences resulting from nullification 
against the backdrop of this test, taking Dutch and Belgian law as an example because these 
systems of law allow for nullification in the situations to be described. Having said that, 
nullification may not be possible in all countries, something which I also ask the reader to 
consider on the basis of his/her own system of law. For sake of brevity, I will analyse such 
consequences by mentioning that a consumer nullifies an agreement on account of personalised 
pricing when I should be referring more precisely to the situation that a consumer nullifies an 
agreement on account of it having been concluded as a result or under the influence of 
personalised pricing constituting, for the average consumer, an unfair commercial practice within 
the meaning of the UCPD and that all the relevant requirements have been met. 
 
3. Keep product free of charge 
 
In case an agreement has been concluded as a result of an unfair commercial practice, Belgian 
law provides for the possibility to have the consumer keep the product provided free of charge. A 
Belgian judge may, in case of an unfair commercial practice comprised of a misleading omission 
- which we assume personalised pricing to be - order the supplier to refund to the consumer all 
amounts paid without the consumer being required to return the goods received or reimburse the 
value of the services provided to the supplier (art. VI.38, VI.94 under 1° and VI.99 Wetboek van 
economisch recht (Belgian Code of Economic Law)).18 According to legislative history, a Belgian 
judge may only exercise this discretionary power if a high threshold has been met: it needs to 
established that the contract would never have been concluded without the personalised 
pricing.19 Given the gravity of the sanction, which some say is punitive20 or even draconian,21 it is 
                                                   
17 Art. 13 UCPD speaks of “penalties”, but it is evident from inter alia the Dutch, German and French 
language versions that this word is used as a synonym for “sanctions”. See for an analysis of the 
terms “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” in light of European case law D Poelzig, ‘Private or 
Public Enforcement of the UCP Directive? Sanctions and Remedies to Prevent Unfair Commercial 
Practices’ in Willem H van Boom and others (eds.), The European Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive. Impact, Enforcement Strategies and National Legal Systems (Ashgate 2014) 240-242. Also, 
during a symposium on 6 September 2019 in The Hague and in furtherance of her inaugural address 
on sanctions in consumer law on 5 March 2019 at the University of Groningen, Charlotte MDS 
Pavillon presented preliminary results of empirical research in which she asked district court judges 
and aids to comment on statements and rule on fictitious cases relating to the criteria of effectiveness, 
proportionality and dissuasiveness in consumer law. 
18 This used to be art. 41 of the Belgian Wet Marktpraktijken en Consumentenbescherming (act 
Market Practices and Consumer Protection (WMPC)). See for a concise summary of that law Bert 
Keirsbilck, The New European Law of Unfair Commercial Practices and Competition Law (Hart 2011) 
472-474. 
19 This follows from legislative history: Verslag Commissie Bedrijfsleven, Parl. St. Kamer, 2006-07, 
DOC 51, 2983/004 at 9. Other authors have, however, argued that this interpretation in legislative 
history is too strong and that it is sufficient that there is a causal link between the unfair commercial 
practice and the conclusion of the contract, see Reinhard Steennot and Paul GFA Geerts, ‘De 
implementatie van de richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België en Nederland’ (2011) 3 Tijdschrift 
voor Privaatrecht 754-756. 
20 Paul GFA Geerts, H Bart Krans, Reinhard Steennot and Albert J Verheij, Oneerlijke 
handelspraktijken: praktijkervaringen in België met de sanctie van artikel 41 WMPC (Boom Juridische 
uitgevers 2011) 72-77. 
21 Evelyne Terryn, ‘Misleidende en vergelijkende praktijken na de omzetting van de richtlijn oneerlijke 
handelspraktijken’ in Gert Straetmans and others (eds.), De wet handelspraktijken anno 2008 (Kluwer 
2008) 82-84; Evelyne Terryn, ‘De omzetting van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België: 
reculer pour mieux sauter?’ (2008) 1 Tijdschrift voor Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 24; and 
 7 
understandable that the threshold is high. Generally, the more extreme the sanction, the higher 
the threshold required to trigger it. To be fair, the application of the sanction in practice may be 
less draconian than may seem at first sight. Once the threshold for triggering it has been passed, 
a Belgian judge may exercise his discretionary power to apply the sanction as he/she deems fit: 
in whole or in part. In doing so, he/she may take into account the gravity of the infringement, the 
extent to which the consumer’s behaviour was influenced, the financial consequences of the 
infringement for the consumer (including damages suffered) as well as the sanction’s 
proportionality.22  
The question is whether this sanction is in line with the “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive” requirement set out in art. 13 UCPD. Before deciding to dismiss any sanction 
resulting in a free ride as being disproportional, it needs to be borne in mind that EU consumer 
law already provides for sanctions allowing consumers to keep goods and services free of 
charge. The CRD, for instance, seeks to counter inertia selling by allowing the consumer to keep, 
without consideration, unsolicited goods delivered and services provided (art. 27). However, the 
difference between the Belgian unfair commercial practices sanction and the EU inertia selling 
sanction is that in the personalised pricing case, the consumer has actively sought to acquire the 
relevant good or service, whereas in the inertia selling case, the consumer was passive and did 
not seek to acquire that good or service. In light of this difference between active and passive, 
the Belgian ‘consumer takes all’ approach seems disproportional. The mere fact that the sanction 
may in practice not be applied to the fullest extent does not take away from the fact that the 
sanction as such is disproportional on the basis of its statutory text. When determining whether a 
sanction is “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”, I believe the full application of the sanction 
provided should be considered, not whether a judge may apply the sanction to a lesser extent. 
Applying the latter criterion would not only provide less legal certainty, but also bring many 
sanctions out of scope of art. 13 UCPD because judges in many cases are at liberty to apply 
sanctions to a lesser extent than full application of the statutory text would allow for. 
 In any case, the Belgian sanction seems effective and dissuasive in theory. Ironically, this 
does not seem to be the case in practice. In 2011, a report on this Belgian sanction was 
published at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security’s Research and 
Documentation Centre (WODC).23 On the basis of extensive research, the researchers 
concluded that the sanction seems to be a dead letter and that businesses do not appear to be 
deterred in their conduct by the sanction’s existence. 
 
4. Return product, get money back and pay usage compensation (full nullification with 
mitigation of consequences) 
 
In light of the seemingly disproportional, ineffective and insufficiently dissuasive character of the 
Belgian ‘consumer takes all’ approach, it is worthwhile to consider how more nuanced 
approaches play out and whether they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, as required by 
the UCPD. One approach could be to fully nullify an agreement concluded as a result of an unfair 
commercial practice and subsequently mitigate the consequences of such nullification, e.g. by 
letting the consumer pay a compensation for the use he/she has made of the product prior to 
nullification. I will discuss this option below, using Dutch law as an example. As will be shown, 
what makes this challenging, is that existing statute with respect to the consequences of 
nullification is ill-equipped to deal with situations where the good or service acquired is perfectly 
fine, as is the case in case of personalised pricing. 
                                                   
Bert Keirsbilck, ‘Vijf jaar toepassing van de Richtlijn oneerlijke handelspraktijken in België (2007-
2012)’ (2012) 11 SEW 469. 
22 Herman de Bauw, ‘De algemene verbodsbepalingen in de relatie verkoper-consument’ in 
Straetmans (n 21) 141-142 and Reinhard Steennot, Filip Bogaert, Diederik Bruloot and Delphine 
Goens, Wet marktpraktijken (Intersentia 2010) 65-66. 
23 Geerts and others (n 20). After the research was published, the following judgment was rendered in 
a case where failure to provide certain information was considered an unfair trade practice and the 
Belgian ‘consumer takes it all’ sanction was applied: J.P. Charleroi 1 February 2017 Journal des juges 
de paix et de police 2017 510, with case annotation by prof. Hervé Jacquemin and with thanks to him 
for pointing this out to me and providing me with a copy of the judgment. 
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An agreement that has been concluded as a result of an unfair commercial practice (in 
this case personalised pricing) is subject to nullification (art. 6:193j paragraph 3 of the Dutch Civil 
Code (DCC)).24 If such a nullification right is exercised by the consumer, the entire agreement is 
nullified and therefore considered null and void with retroactive effect as of the moment it was 
concluded (art. 3:53 DCC). As a result, performances rendered are considered to have lacked a 
legal basis ab initio and each party can demand restitution of whatever it has performed for the 
other party (art. 6:203 DCC). In case an agreement is nullified on account of personalised 
pricing, the consequences will depend on whether goods were delivered or services provided, as 
will be shown below. 
 
4.1. Goods and unjust enrichment 
 
In case an agreement with respect to goods sold and delivered (e.g. a car) is nullified on account 
of personalised pricing, the consumer who has purchased such goods must return those goods 
to the supplier who has sold such goods, and the supplier must pay back the purchase price to 
the consumer. Is the consumer subsequently required to pay a compensation for the use he/she 
made of the goods prior to the moment the agreement was nullified, i.e. a usage charge? Given 
that paying a usage charge is a more common consequence of rescinding a contract on account 
of non-conformity (defect) of goods sold, it makes sense to first consider this easier, yet similar 
situation and subsequently use the lessons learnt when discussing the more difficult situation of 
determining whether a usage charge should be paid in case an agreement is nullified on account 
of personalised pricing. 
In the Quelle case, the ECJ ruled that no usage charges may be charged in case a 
defective product is replaced, noting that the Sale and Guarantee Directive 1999/4425 
“preclud[es] national legislation under which a seller who has sold consumer products which are 
not in conformity may require the consumer to pay compensation for the use of those defective 
products until their replacement with new products.”26 Nonetheless and more importantly for the 
purposes of this article, the ECJ also noted that this hard-and-fast rule should not be 
automatically applied to the rescission of an agreement on account of a defect. To substantiate, 
the ECJ pointed to recital 15 of the Sale and Guarantee Directive, which allows Member States 
to provide that a reimbursement to the consumer in case of rescission “may be reduced to take 
account of the use the consumer has had of the products since they were delivered to him”.27 It 
                                                   
24 Interestingly, this nullification was not introduced into Dutch law when the law implementing the 
UCPD entered into force on 15 October 2008 (Staatsblad 2008, 397 and 398), but when the law 
implementing the CRD entered into force on 13 June 2014 as a result of approving a motion brought 
forward by a member of parliament (Staatsblad 2014, 140). See for the reasons why Leonieke BA 
Tigelaar, Sanctionering van informatieplichten uit de Richtlijn consumentenrechten. Doctoral Thesis 
Groningen (Uitgeverij Paris 2017) nrs. 308-312 and 407-414. For a free English version of the DCC, 
see http://dutchcivillaw.com. 
25 Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L171/12. 
26 ECJ Case C-404/06 Quelle v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände 
[2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008 paragraph 43. The facts of the case are summarized as follows by the ECJ in 
paragraph 12: “In August 2002, Quelle delivered a ‘stove-set’ to Ms Brüning for her private use. In 
early 2004, Ms Brüning noticed that the appliance was not in conformity. Since repair was not 
possible, Ms Brüning returned the appliance to Quelle, who replaced it with a new appliance. 
However, Quelle required Ms Brüning to pay EUR 69.97 by way of compensation for the benefit which 
she had obtained from use of the appliance initially delivered.” 
27 ECJ Quelle (n 25) paragraph 38-39 pointing to recital 15 of Directive 1999/44 (n 25) which reads in 
full “Whereas Member States may provide that any reimbursement to the consumer may be reduced 
to take account of the use the consumer has had of the goods since they were delivered to him; 
whereas the detailed arrangements whereby rescission of the contract is effected may be laid down in 
national law;”. See also Jaap Hijma, Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands 
Burgerlijk Recht. 7. Internationaal privaatrecht. Deel I*. Koop en ruil (Kluwer 2013) nr. 522a, with a 
reference to Hof Arnhem 23 November 2004 ECLI:NL:GHARN:2004:AV1205 NJF 2006 66 
(Pouw/Mans) (Neth.). See also Vanessa Mak, ‘‘Kosteloze’ vervanging bij non-conformiteit: is de 
consument een vergoeding verschuldigd voor het genoten gebruik van een gebrekkige zaak?’ 1 
(2009) 34, who also sees possibilities to charge a usage fee in case of replacement. 
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is this freedom that can be used in case of rescission (art. 6:265 DCC) to reimburse the supplier 
for usage charges on account of unjust enrichment (art. 6:212 DCC), which charges amount to 
reasonable usage charges28 (or, some may argue, depreciation,29 though this seems less likely 
in a B2C context because consumers usually do not have a personal balance sheet, put goods 
purchased on their balance sheet and subsequently depreciate them).30 
And it is also this freedom which could be used by analogy to reimburse the supplier for 
usage charges in case of nullification. After all, nullification bears resemblance to rescission, in 
any case more resemblance to rescission than to replacement. Both in case of nullification and in 
case of rescission, the supplier is required to reimburse the purchase price to the consumer and 
the agreement is no longer in effect.31 And in both those cases, the consumer’s right to exercise 
a remedy is triggered by something attributable to supplier, either his conduct (in case of 
nullification) or his goods (in case of rescission). In contrast, in case of replacement, the supplier 
is not required to reimburse the purchase price to the consumer and the agreement remains in 
force. 
It could even be argued that there is more of a need to award a usage compensation in 
case an agreement is nullified on account of personalised pricing than when an agreement is 
rescinded on account of a defective good. After all, when a good is defective, there is less of a 
need to protect the seller’s interests. As the Dutch legislator explained long before the Quelle 
judgment, a usage charge need not be paid in case of replacement of a defective good because 
the supplier’s interests are already adequately protected given that, among other things: (i) in 
most cases the good has only been used for a short period of time before the defect manifests 
itself; (ii) given this short period of time, significant usage charges seldom arise; and (iii) dealing 
with replacements should not be complicated by disputes about minor usage charges.32 Similar 
arguments could also apply in case an agreement is rescinded on account of a defective good in 
order to argue against awarding usage charges in case a good has only been used for a short 
period of time. However, chances are that it will take far longer for personalised pricing to come 
to light than it will for a defect to manifest itself, in which case the good will have been used for a 
far longer period of time and significant usage charges are more likely to arise. In case an 
agreement concluded under the influence of personalised pricing is nullified, there is therefore 
more of a need to take into account the seller’s interests by requiring the consumer to pay usage 
charges and by doing so let the sanction be proportional. This is especially true given that in 
                                                   
28 Stijn R Damminga, Ongerechtvaardigde verrijking en onverschuldigde betaling als bronnen van 
verbintenissen. Doctoral Thesis Nijmegen (Kluwer 2014) 240-242. See also Teun van der Linden, 
Aanvullend Verrijkingsrecht. Doctoral Thesis Leiden (Boom juridisch 2019) 157-159, who advocates 
that the market value of the use of the good should be used as criterion. 
29 Hijma (n 27) nr. 400. 
30 Inspiration can also be drawn from Belgian law, which seems to allow for a usage compensation by 
extrapolating the rule that the possessor of a good is, in certain cases, required to provide the good’s 
fruit to the owner, see Rafaël Jafferali, La rétroactivité dans le contrat (Bruylant 2014) nr. 259, whilst 
referring to (at the time) art. 549, 550, 1382 and 1383 Belgian Civil Code as well as Hof van Cassatie 
2 October 2008 Pas. 2008, 521 J.L.M.B. 2009 1257 (Belgium). 
31 Albeit that with respect to the past, in case of nullification, termination has retroactive effect, the 
agreement is considered never to have come into existence (art. 3:53 DCC) and each party can 
demand restitution of whatever it has performed for the other party (art. 6:203 DCC); whereas in case 
of rescission, the termination does not have retroactive effect (art. 6:269 DCC) and results in parties 
being required to undo their past obligations (art. 6:270 DCC). 
32 Wim HM Reehuis and Evelieke E Slob, Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek. Boek 7 (Invoering boeken 3, 5 en 6) (Kluwer 1991) 136-137 (MvT) and 141-142 (MvA II). 
Article 14 paragraph 4 of the Directive (EU) 2019/771 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods, amending Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC [2019] OJ L136/28, to 
be transposed into national law by 1 July 2021, explicitly provides that “The consumer shall not be 
liable to pay for normal use made of the replaced goods during the period prior to their replacement.” 
However, the latter rule only pertains to replacement and care should be taken not to apply that rule 
to rescission in light of art. 3 paragraph 6 of the directive, which states in furtherance of its recital 60 
that it “shall not affect the freedom of Member States to regulate aspects of general contract law, such 
as rules on the formation, validity, nullity or effects or contracts, including the consequences of the 
termination of a contract, in so far as they are not regulated in this Directive, or the right to damages.” 
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case of personalised pricing there was (and is) nothing wrong with the good delivered, whereas 
in most cases of nullification the supplier’s conduct entitles the consumer to nullify, but the 
supplier’s good is also defective.33 Take for example a seller who fails to inform a consumer that 
the car’s odometer has been tampered with or that the soil is heavily polluted. In those cases, the 
benefit the consumer has had of the goods in question is far less than the benefit he/she has had 
in cases of personalised pricing where the goods were not defective. 
However, it can also be argued that no usage compensation in case or rescission should 
be awarded to the seller in light of the following. In case of a consumer sale, the rescission 
remedy is of a secondary nature when compared to the specific performance remedies of repair 
and replacement, i.e. and more specifically, the consumer may only rescind the sales agreement 
if (i) the seller has not repaired or replaced the product within a reasonable period of time and 
without significant inconvenience for the consumer or (ii) repair or replacement is impossible or 
cannot be required of the seller, see article 7:22 paragraph 2 DCC.34 Especially with respect to 
the first scenario it may not be logical to award the seller a usage compensation for the period of 
time between the moment the consumer required the seller to repair or replace the defective 
product and the moment the consumer rescinded the agreement.35 
Also, a comparison can be made to usage charges payable in case the consumer 
exercises his statutory right to withdraw from a distance sales contract regardless of whether the 
good is defective (art. 9 CRD). That withdrawal right was introduced to allow the consumer to 
test and inspect the goods purchased by means of distance sales contract (e.g. from a 
webshop). This is something he/she cannot do prior to the purchase and which he/she could 
have done, had he/she purchased from a brick-and-mortar store, see recital 37 CRD. In those 
situations, the consumer may need to pay an amount to the supplier “in the case where he/she 
has made use of those products in a manner incompatible with the principles of civil law, such as 
those of good faith or unjust enrichment…”, as the ECJ ruled in the Messner case.36 Later on, 
this rule was codified and transformed to a specific statutory right in art. 14 paragraph 2 CRD, 
which states that the consumer is “liable for any diminished value of the products resulting from 
the handling of the products other than what is necessary to establish the nature, characteristics 
and functioning of the products.” Yet it was the Messner judgement which, from an EU 
perspective, trailblazed the path for unjust enrichment claims in cases where the consumer used 
products prior to returning them. 
It should also be noted that art. 14 paragraph 2 CRD provides that the consumer is not 
liable for such diminished value if the supplier has not informed the consumer about his 
withdrawal right. Similarly, it could be argued that if a consumer is not informed about 
personalised pricing, the consumer should not be liable for a diminished value of the goods 
purchased, and therefore not be required to pay a usage compensation. However, unlike in case 
of the CRD, even the proposal for amending the CRD (n 9) does not specifically provide for such 
a sanction in case the consumer is not informed about personalised pricing. In the absence of 
such a statutory rule, the comparison with the CRD does not allow for the argument that the 
consumer should not be required to pay a usage compensation to the supplier. 
Furthermore, the consumer may lodge a supplementary damage claim because the 
statute specifically provides that an unfair commercial practice (which we assume personalised 
pricing to be) is an act of tort (art. 6:193b paragraph 1 DCC). It is here that the supplier’s conduct 
will be of more relevance than in case of deciding on the amount of usage compensation due by 
the consumer. If, for example, the defect of a good is caused by the seller’s supplier and not 
                                                   
33 See e.g. HR 14 November 2008 ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BF0407 NJ 2008 588 (Van Dalfsen/Gemeente 
Kampen) (Neth.). 
34 See with respect to the order of remedies (repair/replacement first, rescission second) also art. 3 
paragraph 5 of Directive 1999/44 (n 25), to be repealed and replaced by art. 13 paragraph 4 under (a) 
and (d) Directive 2019/711 (n 32) as of 1 January 2022. 
35 See Marco BM Loos, Consumentenkoop (Monografieën BW nr. B65b) (Wolters Kluwer 2019) nr. 37 
with a reference to analogous application of art. 7:10 paragraph 4 DCC and Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 
24 May 2016 ECLI:NL:GHARL:2016:3985 (Lekkende camper) (Neth.). 
36 ECJ Case C-489/07 Pia Messner v Firma Stefan Krüger [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:502. This 
judgement was rendered under the predecessor of the CRD, the Directive 97/7/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance 
contracts [1997] OJ L144/19. 
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known by the seller (but the seller is still responsible for such defect37), this may be ‘less worse’ 
than the conscious decision of a supplier not to inform the consumer about the fact that he uses 
personalised pricing. Seeing that the usage compensation focuses more on the benefit the 
consumer has had of the product than the supplier’s conduct, it seems more logical to consider 
this ‘worse behaviour’ when deciding upon a damage claim. 
Having said that, from the consumer’s point of view, lodging a damage claim on account 
of tort is best avoided because of the additional requirements which need to be met by the 
consumer and the additional defences available to the supplier, e.g. limitations of liability, 
reduction of damages because of failure to mitigate damages or own fault (art. 6:101 DCC). 
Nonetheless, the existence of such a claim may convince those who believe that awarding the 
supplier a usage charge is not sufficiently effective and dissuasive, as required by art. 13 UCPD. 
Admittedly, case law by the Dutch Supreme Court seems to point in a different direction. In a 
case where all-in mobile telephony agreements (i.e. agreements combining the provision of a 
‘free’ mobile phones with mobile subscriptions) were nullified, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled 
that consumers did not need to pay usage charges on the basis of unjust enrichment.38 This, the 
court ruled, would not be reasonable39 because it would detract from the effectiveness and 
dissuasiveness of the sanction and not protect consumers adequately. This judgment has 
rightfully been heavily criticised as being disproportional.40  
I believe that the sanctions I propose are, on the other hand, proportional because they 
balance the interests of the consumer (by allowing for full nullification, with a right to sue for 
damages, if need be) with those of the supplier (by requiring the consumer to pay usage 
charges, on account of unjust enrichment, in case the agreement is nullified). Furthermore, 
softening the effects of sanctions by means of unjust enrichment is an option which the ECJ itself 
entertained in the Quelle and Messner judgments discussed above. I also believe the sanctions 
proposed are sufficiently “dissuasive” as required by art. 13 UCPD. Even though the supplier 
may be awarded usage charges and the grave consequences of nullification are therefore 
mitigated for him, he/she still receives back the goods concerned and will need to resell them in 
order to make a similar profit as he/she would have made had the agreement remained intact. 
Also, in order to resell, the supplier will most likely need to repackage (or even repair) the good, 
offer it for sale at a discounted price (because it has been used) as well as incur marketing and 
other costs to sell that good again. Those costs are unlikely to be fully recuperated by the usage 
charges to be paid by the consumer. 
At the end of the day, whether or not a supplier is entitled to a usage compensation in 
case an agreement is nullified on account of personalised pricing depends on whether 
proportionality or rather dissuasiveness and effectiveness is favoured. Weighing the arguments, I 
believe a usage compensation should be paid for the reasons set out above.  
 
4.2. Services and value compensation 
 
                                                   
37 HR 27 April 2001 ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1338 NJ 2002 213 (Oerlemans/Driessen) (Neth.). 
38 HR 12 February 2016 ECLI:NL:HR:2016:236 NJ 2017 282 (Lindorff/Nazier) (Neth.) paragraph 3.16 
and Verkade (n 6) nr. 71a. The Dutch Supreme Court’s decision was based, among other things, on 
the argument that the mobile telephony agreements were in conflict with Dutch legislation 
implementing the Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC [2008] OJ 
L133/66. 
39 Reasonableness is one of the statutory requirements for an unjust enrichment claim to be awarded 
on account of art. 6:212 DCC. 
40 See e.g. Jaap Hijma in his annotation of HR Lindorff/Nazier (n 38), paragraph 19-20 and Jaap 
Hijma, ‘Ontwikkelingen overeenkomstenrecht (III)’ (2017) 7166 WPNR 783 as well as Charlotte MDS 
Pavillon, ‘Materieelrechtelijke beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de tweede gratis-mobieltjes- 
uitspraak van de Hoge Raad. HR 12 February 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:236.’ (2016) 5 Tijdschrift voor 
Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 239. See also Nicolaas Huppes, Charlotte MDS Pavillon & 
Thomas L Wildenbeest, ‘De fabel van het gratis mobieltje’ (2019) 5 NTBR 20 who advocate an 
alternative sanction. 
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In case an agreement with respect to services fully41 provided (e.g. a flight) is nullified on account 
of personalised pricing, as explained, the legal ground for past performances is considered to 
have been absent ab initio (art. 3:53 DCC) and each party can demand restitution of whatever it 
has performed for the other party (art. 6:203 DCC). However, unlike goods delivered, services 
provided cannot, by their nature, be given back to the supplier. Therefore, Dutch statute 
specifically provides: “If the performance by its nature precludes reversal, reimbursement of the 
value of the performance at the time of its receipt shall be made instead of restitution, insofar as 
is reasonable, provided that the recipient has been enriched by the performance or was 
responsible for the performance being effected or if he had agreed to give some value in 
exchange.” (art. 6:210 paragraph 2 DCC).42 In the given situation, the consumer who took a flight 
from A to B, but subsequently nullified the agreement, was clearly enriched by the flight. 
Therefore, he/she should, in principle, reimburse the value of the service, objectively set at the 
market value at the moment of its receipt insofar reasonable (art. 6:210 paragraph 2 DCC).43 
There seem to be two ways to determine such usage charge, each of which has its own 
advantages and disadvantages, as I will now show.  
The first way to determine the usage charges to be paid (if any) is to have the consumer 
pay a value reimbursement to the supplier set at the market value at the time of receipt, i.e. the 
day of the flight (as the main rule of nullification prescribes in art. 6:210 paragraph 2 DCC). 
However, price fluctuations between the moment of booking and the day of the flight could work 
in favour, but also to the detriment of the consumer, the fairness of which leaves much to be 
desired. Given this uncertainty, this option is not viable and should be ruled out. 
The second way to determine the usage charges to be paid, is to apply the more detailed 
statute and legal literature on the consequences of rescission on account of breach of contract 
(art. 6:272 DCC) by analogy.44 That regime distinguishes between the situation where 
performance has been rendered properly and the situation where it has not. In the former case, 
the value to be reimbursed by the consumer almost always amounts to the contract price, 
whereas in the latter case the value is set at the value the service has actually had for the 
consumer.45 Seeing that in case of personalised pricing, the service has been provided properly 
and in full and the consumer has enjoyed the full benefit thereof, the value reimbursement would 
                                                   
41 In order to not complicate matters even further, I will assume in this article that all services have 
been fully performed, not partially. 
42 All translations of articles from the Dutch civil code are from the online version of Hans Warendorf 
and others, Warendorf Dutch Civil and Commercial Law Legislation (Wolters Kluwer 2013). 
43 CJ van Zeben, JW du Pon and MM Olthof, Parlementaire geschiedenis van het Nieuwe Burgerlijk 
Wetboek. Boek 6 (Kluwer 1981) 818-9 (TM) and HR 5 December 2014 ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3532 NJ 
2016 159 (Michielse/gemeente Reusel-De Mierden) (Neth.). See with respect to Belgian law Joke 
Baeck, Restitutie na vernieting of ontbinding van overeenkomsten. Doctoral Thesis Gent (Intersentia 
2012), who notes that the current communis opinio is that the recipient of the service is required to 
reimburse the costs which he/she has saved by receiving the service with a maximum of the price 
which a reasonably acting and interested service provider and a reasonably acting and interested 
service recipient would have agreed upon at the moment of receipt of the service (nr. 52) and that a 
modern sui generis approach entails that the value reimbursement is equal to the objective value at 
the moment the service is received and may not be based on the price contractually agreed upon 
because the contract in which such price was agreed upon was nullified (nr. 103 and with a useful 
table on various scenario’s nr. 246). Claeys adds that in some cases, the value to be reimbursed may 
coincide with the contractually agreed upon price, see Ignace Claeys, ‘Nietigheid van contractuele 
verbintenissen in beweging’ in Orde van Advocaten Kortrijk, Sancties en nietigheden (Larcier 2003) 
nr. 79. 
44 Art. 6:272 DCC reads: "Where the nature of performance is such that it cannot be reversed, 
compensation takes its place up to its value at the time of receipt." (paragraph 1) and "Where the 
performance did not conform to the obligation, this compensation is limited to the amount of the value 
which the performance has really had for the recipient at that time and in the given circumstances." 
(paragraph 2). 
45 Carla H Sieburgh, Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk 
Recht. 6. Verbintenissenrecht. Deel III. Algemeen overeenkomstenrecht (Wolters Kluwer 2018) nr. 
704, René JQ Klomp and Harriët N Schelhaas (ed.), Groene Serie Verbintenissenrecht (Wolters 
Kluwer online), art. 6:272 DCC comment 3 (Willem H van Boom) 1-3-2018 and Van der Linden (n 28) 
157-159. 
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be set at the contract price. The net result of the supplier paying back the money received and 
the consumer paying the contract price would of course be zero, i.e. the consumer would not 
receive back any money. 
This may not seem reasonable to the consumer and he/she will likely argue that the mere 
fact that the service has been provided in full and properly is insufficient to effectively deprive him 
of rights to act against personalised pricing, especially in those cases where personalised pricing 
only came to light after the service was fully and properly provided. This may also not be 
dissuasive for the supplier. However, not empowering the individual consumer with a sufficiently 
dissuasive nullification remedy does not necessarily mean that the arsenal of available sanctions 
is not sufficiently dissuasive. Again, a supplementary damages claim could be lodged by the 
consumer because the statute specifically provides that an unfair commercial practice (which we 
assume personalised pricing to be) is an act of tort (art. 6:193b paragraph 1 DCC). Although, as 
explained, this route is best avoided from the consumer’s point of view because of the additional 
requirements which need to be met by the consumer and the additional defences available to the 
supplier, it seems to be the only viable option if the consumer wishes to receive some form of 
compensation. 
 
5. Purchase price reduction (partial nullification or full nullification with conversion) 
 
Given these discussions, the question arises whether, instead of fully nullifying the agreement 
and subsequently mitigating unwanted consequences (both for the supplier and the consumer), it 
would be simpler to nullify the agreement only partially. That not only seems less complicated, 
but also mitigates unwanted consequences, is in line with the (perceived) interests of the 
consumer and is propagated in legal literature.46 However, from a dogmatic perspective, this 
solution poses all sorts of problems. Nullification on account of unfair commercial practices (such 
as personalised pricing) pertains to the entire agreement (art. 6:193j paragraph 3 DCC). The 
statute does not, in other words, specifically allow for partial nullification. However, on the basis 
of the general concept that ‘whoever is entitled to more, is also entitled to do less’, it is accepted 
that, in general, a partial quantitative nullification is permitted, but a partial qualitative nullification 
is not.47 So, for example, it is permitted to nullify an agreement with respect to a part of the goods 
delivered, resulting in the consumer being required to return that part (e.g. 20 of the 100 crates of 
apples delivered) and the supplier being required to return the purchase price pertaining thereto 
(in this example the purchase price of 20 crates of apples). On the other hand, it is not permitted 
for the consumer to use partial nullification to achieve a purchase price reduction (actio quanti 
minoris), resulting in the consumer keeping the entire delivery, but the supplier being required to 
pay back part of the purchase price.48 
Instead, the Dutch legal system is structured in such a way that once nullification is 
invoked, the entire agreement is nullified and, by operation of law, converted into a valid 
                                                   
46 Charlotte MDS Pavillon and Leonieke BA Tigelaar, ‘Vernietiging van de overeenkomst bij een 
oneerlijke handelspraktijk; een hanteerbare sanctie?’ (2018) 3 Contracteren 78. 
47 Klomp and others (n 45), art. 6:228 BW nr. 1.2.4.2 (Jaap Hijma) 1-8-2017, whilst referring to a case 
of Hof Arnhem 24 March 1976 ECLI:NL:GHARN:1976:AC5717 NJ 1978 421 (Neth.) where 
nullification was permitted with respect to 3040 of the 4000 crates of apples delivered. A judge may, 
however, achieve results which would have been achieved had partial nullification been recognised 
by using art. 3:53 paragraph 2 and, in case of error, 6:230 paragraph 2 DCC, but the judge may only 
do so if parties have so requested (so not ex officio). These options will be disregarded to not 
complicate matters even further. 
48 Sieburgh (n 45) nr. 698, Jaap Hijma (ed.), Groene Serie Vermogensrecht (Wolters Kluwer online), 
art. 3:41 nr. 5.1.4.1 (Saskia de Loos-Wijker) 1-11-2017; Jaap Hijma, Nietigheid en vernietigbaarheid 
van rechtshandelingen. Doctoral Thesis Leiden (Kluwer 1988) 287-294; Mirella EMG Peletier, 
Rechterlijke vrijheid en partij-autonomie. Over de toepassing van discretionaire 
wijzingsbevoegdheden in het contractenrecht, Doctoral Thesis VU Amsterdam (Boom Juridische 
Uitgevers 1999) 30-36; and Jaap Hijma, ‘Koopprijsvermindering’ (2018) 7202 WPNR 568-569. 
However, in case of breach of contract, price reduction with respect to quality is possible by means of 
partial rescission (art. 6:265 and 6:270 DCC) or by means of a specific statutory instrument on 
account of non-conformity of the goods sold in case of a B2C sale (art. 7:22 paragraph 1 under b 
DCC), see Hijma (n 27) nr. 531-531b. 
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agreement if (and only if) it can be assumed that the parties would have concluded that valid 
agreement if they would have abandoned the invalid agreement had they known about its 
invalidity (art. 3:42 DCC). The Belgian legal system seems to be structured in a similar manner.49 
Therefore, with respect to the case at hand, the question needs to be answered whether the 
parties would have concluded another agreement in the absence of online personalised pricing 
and what the contents of that agreement would have been. 
This is where the system may rear its ugly head. If the supplier is able to prove that 
he/she would not have concluded the agreement without personalised pricing, he/she is able to 
prevent conversion of the nullified agreement kicking in and thereby retain full nullification with 
the mitigating consequences set out in section 4 above, i.e. the payment of a usage 
compensation. This scenario is not as far-fetched as it might seem at first sight. If the supplier’s 
entire pricing system is based upon personalised pricing, cherry picking would seriously 
undermine this system and may ultimately lead to a loss-making business and therefore its 
collapse. And that is precisely why, from the supplier’s perspective, it should not be permitted to 
achieve a purchase price reduction by means of conversion of a nullified agreement. Let me 
explain this with an example. If a fair and reasonable price of a product without personalised 
pricing would normally be 110 (comprised of 50 fixed costs per month, 50 variable costs for each 
sale, at a profit margin of 10%), the supplier may use personalised pricing to sell that product for 
130 to one consumer in one month and for 90 to another consumer in another month.50 If the 
consumer to whom the product has been sold for 130 nullifies the agreement, but argues that the 
nullified agreement can continue to exist insofar he/she pays 110, the supplier may well be able 
to successfully argue that he/she would not have sold the good for 110 because in such a case 
he/she would not have been able to compensate the loss-making sale for 90 with the profit-
making sale for 130. In such a case, the supplier would much rather have the entire sale for 130 
nullified and receive the good back so that he/she has another chance of selling that good for 
130 to another consumer (possibly after repairing the good with the money received by the 
consumer for the use he/she has made of the product prior to the nullification). The supplier 
would, in other words, not have concluded another agreement in the absence of online 
personalised pricing, which means that the nullified agreement cannot be converted into a valid 
one and that full nullification takes effect with the mitigating consequences set out in section 4 
above. 
Interestingly, forcing full nullification upon the consumer in such a way may also not be in 
the consumer’s best interest. Seeing that personalised pricing is aimed at selling to the 
consumer at the maximum price he/she is prepared to pay for such good, it can safely be 
assumed that the consumer was indeed prepared to and paid such maximum price of 130. In 
that case, the consumer may well wish to keep the entire agreement intact if a price reduction to 
110 is not awarded because of the reasons described above. The alternative of having the entire 
agreement nullified, return the product and pay a usage compensation may be even worse for 
                                                   
49 Thijs Tanghe, Gedeeltelijke ontbinding en vernietiging van overeenkomsten. Doctoral Thesis Gent 
(Intersentia 1015) nr. 190-196, who subsequently criticises this criterion (in nrs. 198-209) and 
proposes (in nrs. 210-263) a topoi-based approached to determine whether keeping the agreement 
partially intact can reasonably be expected from contractual parties. See also Frederik Peeraer, 
Nietigheid en aanverwante rechtsfiguren in het vermogensrecht. Doctoral Thesis KU Leuven 
(Intersentia 2019), who summarises the communis opinio (in nrs. 333-335) and who advocates a 
nullity which acts as specifically as possible (in nr. 346 e.a.). 
50 Assuming that each consumer pays the maximum amount he/she is prepared to pay, but no more 
than the price set by the supplier, using personalised pricing (and selling one product to one 
consumer for 130 and another product to another consumer at 90) is more beneficial to the supplier 
than not using personalised pricing (and trying to sell all his products at 110). In the former case, 
he/she would sell two products in two months (one for 130 and another for 90) and make a profit of 20 
(turnover of 130 minus costs of 50 + 50 for the first deal in the first month and turnover of 90 minus 
costs of 50 + 50 for the second deal in the second month). In the latter case, he/she would only sell 
one good for 110 (because the other consumer is only prepared to buy at a maximum price of 90) and 
thus make a loss of 40 (turnover of 110 minus costs of 50 + 50 in the first month and fixed costs of 50 
in the second month assuming the good is made to order). 
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him.51 If we would wish to protect the consumer seeking a price reduction against a full 
nullification rearing its ugly head with unintended consequences, perhaps a creative 
interpretation of EU consumer law may come to the rescue. In the recent Santander case, the 
ECJ has ruled that “a national court may substitute a supplementary provision of domestic law 
for an unfair contractual term …” and that “that possibility is limited to situations in which the 
invalidation of that contractual term would require the court to annul the agreement in its entirety, 
thereby exposing the consumer to such consequences that he would be penalised as a result.”52 
Admittedly, the judgment is limited to the situation at hand, but perhaps a more general concept 
may be deduced from it: invalidating an agreement in whole or in part may not result in the 
consumer being placed in a situation which is worse than he/she would have been in, had that 
agreement or part not been invalidated. This leads to all sorts of interesting procedural law 
questions, the answering of which is beyond the scope of this article.53 If that general concept 
may be used and those procedural law hurdles taken in case a consumer is not successful in 
achieving a price reduction by means of nullification, a judge could rule that the agreement 
remains intact. 
Another question is whether price reduction by means of converting a nullified agreement 
is permissible in light of the fact that in quite a number of legal systems (including in the 
Netherlands), the concept that the price needs to be just (iustum pretium) is rejected for reasons 
of party autonomy and legal certainty.54 Also in EU consumer law, the iustum pretium concept 
seems to be rejected. Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 
1993/13 (Unfair Contract Terms Directive)55 determines: “Assessment of the unfair nature of the 
terms shall [not] relate … to … the adequacy of the price and remuneration, on the one hand, as 
against the services or products supplies in exchange, on the other…”.56 Is it that rejected 
concept which the judge would need to apply in case he/she wishes to nullify the sale for 130 
and convert it to another sale, for say 110? Arguably, that is not the case. After all, when 
converting a nullified agreement and determining a price, the judge is not assessing whether the 
price of 130 is fair or unfair, but ‘merely’ dealing with the consequences of nullification. Having 
said that, it will still be extremely difficult for him to determine what the price would be in practice 
(in our example: 110) because if the entire pricing mechanism is based on personalised pricing, 
a set baseline price for that particular supplier and that particular product or service no longer 
                                                   
51 See also A(Bert) C van Schaick, ‘Partiële vernietigbaarheid’ (2018) 7 NTBR 196-203, who points 
out that full nullification could be forced upon the consumer against his will and argues in favour of 
allowing for a more direct right of partial nullification in order to prevent that risk from materialising. 
52 ECJ Cases C-96/16 and C-94/17 Banco Santander v Demba & Bonet and Escobedo Cortés v 
Banco de Sabadell [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:643 paragraph 74, in furtherance of, among other 
judgments ECJ Case Kásler v Jelzálogbank [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:282. 
53 Such questions include (and the answering of which also depends on the way parties litigate): (i) 
must the judge give each party the opportunity to react to the anticipated consequences of full 
nullification or may this instrument only be used in those cases where the consumer has not 
requested nullification, but the judge wishes to nullify ex officio and, before doing do, is required to 
provide said opportunity to the parties in order to protect parties from surprise decisions (see HR 13 
September 2013 ECLI:NL:HR:2013:691 NJ 2014 274 (Heesakkers/Voets) (Neth.) paragraphs 3.9.1-
3.9.3)? and (ii) should the judge, in a simpler manner, interpret the consumer’s nullification claim in 
such a way that it is limited to the situation that price reduction can be achieved and, if this is not 
successful, deny the claim (or ex officio add to the legal ground put forward (nullification) that the 
nullification is provisional on it resulting in price reduction (art. 25 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure))? 
54 Hijma (n 27) nr. 212 and Ton Hartlief, Iustum pretium: op weg naar een rechterlijke toetsing van de 
rechtvaardigheid van het contractuele evenwicht? In Ton Hartlief and others (eds.), Contractvrijheid 
(Kluwer 1999) 239-253. 
55 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ 
L95/29. 
56 However, because the CRD is a minimum harmonisation directive, Member States which, unlike 
the Netherlands, have legislation implementing the iustum pretium concept, may continue to apply 
that legislation, see ECJ Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v Ausbanc 
[2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:309. See also art. 8a of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (n 49), which was 
added by means of art. 32 CRD and which requires a Member State to inform the Commission if it 
adopts provisions which “extend the unfairness assessment to individually negotiated contractual 
terms or to the adequacy of the price or remuneration;…”. 
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exists and benchmarking against competitors could result in comparing oranges to apples. It is 
that difficulty which may make a judge think twice before deciding to embark on that adventure. 
EU consumer law also seems in favour of all-or-nothing sanctions and violently opposed 
to discretionary powers of the judiciary to convert or mitigate its consequences. A good example 
of this is the Banesto case, in which the ECJ ruled that if a term is found to be unfair within the 
meaning of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, a court may not use national law which provides 
him with the power to “modify that contract by revising the content of that term” because “[t]hat 
power would contribute to eliminating the dissuasive effect on sellers or suppliers … in so far as 
those sellers or suppliers would remain tempted to use those terms in the knowledge that, even if 
they were declared invalid, the contract could nevertheless be modified, to the extent necessary, 
by the national court in such a way as to safeguard the interest of those sellers or suppliers.”57 
For all the reasons set out above, partially nullifying or fully nullifying and subsequently 




On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude the following with respect to agreements which I 
assumed have been concluded as a result of personalised pricing constituting an unfair 
commercial practice and can therefore be nullified. The ‘consumer takes it all approach’ (of 
letting the supplier refund to the consumer all amounts paid and the consumer keeping the 
goods received or services provided free of charge) seems disproportional, ineffective and 
insufficiently dissuasive and is therefore not a viable solution (see section 3). With respect to the 
more nuanced approaches, I conclude that it is not a viable solution to partially or fully nullify an 
agreement concluded as a result of an unfair commercial practice and subsequently convert it 
(see section 5). By doing so, the supplier would be forced into an agreement which he/she would 
not have concluded in the absence of personalised pricing, at a price which a judge may be 
hard-pressed to determine (due to manner in which personalised pricing works) and which 
(contrary to EU case law) effectively reduces a sanction. What I believe should happen from a 
civil law perspective, is that if the consumer nullifies the agreement, he/she should receive back 
the purchase price in exchange for returning the goods and paying a usage charge (in case of 
goods) or not be entitled to receive back the contract price (in case of services performed fully 
and properly) (see section 4). Admittedly, the consequences of some of the individual nullification 
actions proposed may not be very dissuasive. However, I believe that they are proportional and 
that any lack of dissuasiveness may be compensated with other sanctions available, such as 
damages claims, as well as collective actions and administrative sanctions, though given the 
scope, focus and length of this article, this is for others to consider. 
 
 
                                                   
57 ECJ Case C-618/10 Banesto v Calderón Camino [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:349 paragraphs 69 and 
73; and also ECJ Case C-488/11 Asbeek Brusse & de Man Garabito v Jahani [2013] 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:341 paragraph 60; ECJ Cases C-482/13, C-484/13, C-485/13 and C-487/13 Unicaja 
Banco and Caixabank [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:21 paragraph 31; ECJ Cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and 
C-308/15 Gutiérrez Naranjo [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:980 paragraph 60. See also Arthur S Hartkamp, 
Mr. C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands Burgerlijk Recht. 3. Vermogensrecht 
algemeen. Deel I. Europees recht en Nederlands vermogensrecht (Wolters Kluwer 2018) nr. 253. 
However, European consumer law does not preclude national law which requires a judge, subject to 
certain restrictions, to adjust a contractual interest rate to a certain statutory interest rate, see ECJ 
Unicaja Banco and Caixabank paragraph 42. 
